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Public Diplomacy and International Conflict
Resolution: A Cautionary Case from Cold
War South America
CH R I S T O P H E R DA R N T O N
Naval Postgraduate School
Can public diplomacy help resolve protracted international conflicts?
Both rationalist and constructivist traditions identify significant domestic
obstacles to international peacemaking. However, Robert Putnam’s con-
cept of “reverberation” implies that diplomats can expand their adver-
saries’ win-sets for cooperation by engaging foreign publics. This paper
analyzes a most-likely case, with archival evidence: Argentine Ambassador
Oscar Camilión’s unsuccessful quest for Argentine-Brazilian rapproche-
ment in 1976–77. Although the two countries later overcame rivalry, public
diplomacy contributed negligibly to this success: internal Argentine divi-
sions created mixed messages toward Brazil, Brazilian leaders launched a
competing public relations operation, and these two currents obstructed
and nearly terminated Camilión’s mission. This case illuminates the para-
doxes of Argentine foreign policymaking under military rule and offers
a cautionary tale for scholars and practitioners of public diplomacy and
conflict resolution.
Can public diplomacy resolve international conflicts and, if so, under what condi-
tions? How stable and significant are the preferences of domestic political actors
as an obstacle to international cooperation, and how amenable are they to persua-
sion and mobilization? From rationalist arguments emphasizing costly signals to
constructivist ones privileging symbolic gestures and reconciliation, international
relations theories maintain that conflict resolution between rival countries requires
diplomatic engagement to break the ice. Scholars have focused on such outreach
primarily in state-to-state or leader-to-leader terms (Armstrong 1993; Kydd 2005;
Kupchan 2010; Nincic 2011).1 However, to the extent that protracted conflicts are
driven by perceptions, identity, ideology, anger, or mistrust (Haas 2005; Hassner
2009; Hopf 2012; Hall 2015), official diplomatic outreach to the opposing citizenry
might be able to alter conflict outcomes by changing minds, whether through pro-
paganda and persuasion aimed at concessions or by opening political space for con-
flict resolution (see Pratkanis 2009; Mor 2012). And if conflicts are rooted in the
opposing interests of dominant domestic groups, then two-level bargaining models
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2 Public Diplomacy and International Conflict Resolution
(Schelling 1960, 19, 24–28, 202; Putnam 1988, 438–41, 444, 450–52) suggest that
engagement with foreign publics could expand an opponent’s win-set (spectrum of
politically acceptable negotiated outcomes) and enable cooperation. In short, pub-
lic diplomacy offers a mechanism for achieving foreign policy breakthroughs and
conflict resolution but one that has not yet been either theoretically articulated or
empirically tested.
The first section of this paper elaborates the theoretical interface between pub-
lic diplomacy and conflict resolution, defines core concepts, and outlines potential
channels of diplomatic influence. Subsequent sections frame, analyze, and draw
conclusions from a most-likely case: Argentine Ambassador Oscar Camilión’s efforts
to build domestic support within Brazil for a peaceful resolution of the Argentine-
Brazilian rivalry after the Argentine military coup of March 1976 and before formal
negotiations with Brazil commenced in September 1977 over the protracted hydro-
electric dispute that was the core issue in their regional rivalry.
This should have been fertile ground for a public diplomat. A strategic rivalry
between regional powers with similar regimes, ideologies, and alliance portfolios,
and without an indivisible territorial dispute or recent bloodshed that could in-
flame nationalist passions and empower hardliners, provided powerful structural
incentives to overcome rivalry and an opportunity for creative diplomacy to tip the
scales for peacemaking. Moreover, rivalry was in fact overcome by the decade’s end,
and Camilión (2000, 203–4, 208, 221) later claimed credit for his public diplomacy
in resolving the conflict, presenting an opportunity for process tracing in a seem-
ingly successful case. Camilión’s memoirs (2000) have become a standard source
for scholars of Argentine-Brazilian relations during the Cold War, but the recent
publication of several important oral history interviews with Camilión’s Brazilian
counterparts allows researchers to cross-check his accounts. Additionally, I present
new declassified evidence from the Argentine Foreign Ministry archives, including
correspondence between Camilión and his superiors in Buenos Aires.2
These documents reveal that despite an apparently promising environment,
Camilión’s efforts failed to produce state-to-state negotiations, let alone rapproche-
ment, and, on at least two occasions, nearly cost him his job. I argue that public
diplomacy failed not because the target (Brazilian) population was unreceptive but
rather because political divisions within the home (Argentine) government created
inconsistent messages and because Brazil eventually mobilized a public opinion
counteroffensive. This case offers sobering grounds on which to rethink the do-
mestic politics of international conflict resolution and the conditions for successful
public diplomacy.
Furthermore, unpacking Camilión’s predicament through primary sources helps
to illuminate the paradoxes of foreign policy and national security decision-
making under Argentine military rule. Known as the Process of National Reor-
ganization (the Proceso, for short), the 1976–83 Argentine junta was vehemently
anti-Communist yet traded with the Soviet Union and fought the Jimmy Carter ad-
ministration’s human rights agenda. The regime was authoritarian but riven by in-
terservice rivalries. It promoted neoliberal economic reforms to shrink the state,
even as the state’s repressive apparatus proliferated. It cooperated enthusiastically
with neighboring right-wing dictatorships against shared leftist enemies through
Operation Condor, and it ultimately achieved rapprochement with Brazil in 1980.
However, ideology proved no barrier to violent conflict, as the 1978 standoff with
Chile over the Beagle Channel and the disastrous 1982 war with Britain over the
Falklands/Malvinas demonstrate. Overall, Argentine foreign policy making under
2
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the Proceso is one of the great puzzles in international security both within and
beyond the Americas.3
Conflict Ripeness and the Diplomacy of Icebreaking
Public diplomacy consists of efforts by elements of one state’s foreign policy appara-
tus to engage another country’s population rather than its government. Although
societal outreach may have once been dismissed as “low politics” or vilified as pro-
paganda (and in either case, as beneath the dignity of professional diplomats), it
is increasingly seen as a vital foreign policy tool. According to the US State Depart-
ment, “The mission of American public diplomacy is to support the achievement
of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance
national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding
and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of the
United States and citizens of the rest of the world” (State Department 2018). Prac-
titioners and contemporary US foreign policy concerns have dominated the writ-
ing on public diplomacy, and the subject is struggling to find an academic home
(see Gregory 2008). Scholarly studies of public diplomacy have primarily focused
on the United States and other Western industrialized countries’ diffuse efforts re-
garding branding and image-building among foreign populations (Chiozza 2009;
Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009; Hayden 2012; Hart 2013), usually emphasizing “soft
power” (Nye 2004) and increasingly examining nongovernmental actors as foreign
affairs protagonists, rather than states’ more focused lobbying initiatives to build
support within the target country for specific policies (cf. Nye 2004, 105–8; what
Nancy Snow [2009, 6] calls “traditional” public diplomacy).4 This specialization is
unfortunate because public diplomacy, both as a foreign policy practice and as a
research program, has much to offer the field of conflict resolution and because
contemporary interstate conflicts often involve developing countries with different
diplomatic traditions and objectives.
In particular, public diplomacy might help counteract two sources of pessimism
about the prospects for international peace and cooperation: domestic interests and
state identities. In rationalist traditions, both sides of debates over domestic vetoes,
audience costs, and foreign policy generally assume fixed, exogenously given prefer-
ences for each actor (Fearon 1994; Snyder and Borghard 2011). The consequences
for international cooperation are stark, as Helen Milner (1997, 241, 251) explains:
“actors’ interests are primordial,” and as such, “the assumption of polyarchy”—that
is, that multiple domestic actors share power and can influence or veto foreign
policies—“never makes cooperation more likely than it is in the anarchic game
between two unitary states. The addition of domestic politics has negative conse-
quences for international cooperation.” However, if preferences are sometimes en-
dogenous to interaction (Gerber and Jackson 1993), then public diplomacy might
be able to build domestic support within the target country for measures such as
dispute resolution or economic integration. Therefore, domestic political dynam-
ics might sometimes enhance, rather than obstruct, the likelihood of international
cooperation.
In constructivist approaches, as well, much hinges on how leaders and peoples
actually change one another’s identities, narratives, role prescriptions (Malici and
Walker 2017), and perceptions and whether they can do so intentionally, strategi-
cally, as entrepreneurs (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore 2003) or whether, as
Alexander Wendt argued (1999, 277–78), states can be tightly locked into a cultural
3
Excellent English-language introductions include Romero 2004; Feitlowitz 1998. On relations with Brazil and
Chile, see Resende-Santos 2002; Oelsner 2005. On relations with the United States, see Schmidli 2013; Sheinin 2006,
chapter Six. On Operation Condor, see McSherry 2005; Kornbluh 2004. On Falklands/Malvinas, see Welch 2002; Levy
and Vakili 1992.
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or normative structure of Hobbesian conflict. Whether scholars view public diplo-
mats as lobbyists trying to shift the preferences of a rational interlocutor (or his or
her constituents) or as entrepreneurs seeking to transform the beliefs and desires
of a socially embedded neighbor, diplomats’ ability to reshape international inter-
actions through creative individual agency deserves new research (Copeland 2009;
Sharp 2009).
Two points from conflict resolution studies are particularly relevant for under-
standing these diplomatic predicaments: ripeness and engagement. First, for rival
countries to resolve their disputes and develop a new cooperative framework, they
need to negotiate with each other, but first they have to agree to come to the table
at all, which can be the most difficult step (Cohen 1997, 45; Limbert 2009, 179,
193). Extensive scholarship emphasizes the structural factors underpinning “ripe
moments” for conflict resolution attempts, including economic and military crises,
policy failures, and compatible governing regimes in both countries (Rock 1989;
Haass 1990). Much of this is driven by costs: as states acquire information about
their worsening circumstances, they search for mutual rather than unilateral advan-
tage. Thus, prenegotiation can help to minimize risk and cost, share information,
and set the agenda.
Second, when ripeness has almost but not quite emerged, there is a power-
ful opportunity for individual agency to finish the job. Structural forces have in-
determinate effects; leaders choose whether to react to crises with escalation or
de-escalation, and their domestic and personal concerns influence those choices
(Lebow 1997, 158, 163–74). Skillful leaders interested in negotiated conflict res-
olution have several communicative tools, from exploiting personal relationships
to creatively framing grand bargains (or, conversely, fractionating issues), to send-
ing costly signals and making symbolic gestures that demonstrate their cooperative
objectives (Armstrong 1993; Long and Brecke 2003; Kydd 2005; Kupchan 2010).
Paradigmatic examples include Richard Nixon’s visit to China, Anwar Sadat’s to Is-
rael, and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Even more powerful
than signals or symbols to correct misperceptions, or framing to alter payoffs, lead-
ers may be able to transform the other country’s interests and preferences (Nincic
2011). These efforts are politically fraught for national leaders, so the vital prelim-
inary tasks of reaching out to a suspicious rival, establishing the possibility of ne-
gotiations, and setting the agenda often fall to envoys. Ambassadors face the enor-
mous political cross-pressures of having to satisfy both the home government and
the host one, playing “two-level games” (Putnam 1988, 433), in which success may
have more to do with structural conditions than with diplomatic skill, but tactical
missteps might still scuttle the enterprise. Public diplomacy might be an attractive
approach for these aspiring peacemakers.
Robert Putnam’s (1988, 435–37) two-level games model depicts the difficulty an
envoy faces in seeking an international agreement that is acceptable both to his or
her foreign counterpart (Level I) and to a domestic audience back home (Level II,
which Putnam primarily illustrates with congressional ratification of a previously ne-
gotiated treaty, although he recognizes that diplomats often have to play both games
simultaneously rather than sequentially). Putnam (1988, 437) defines a “win-set” as
“the set of all possible Level I agreements that would . . . gain the necessary major-
ity among the [Level II] constituents—when simply voted up or down.” Whereas a
larger win-set increases the probability of reaching a cooperative agreement at Level
I, a smaller win-set increases bargaining leverage and makes it more likely that if a
Level I agreement is reached, it will align closely with one’s core preferences. For a
country attempting to build interstate cooperation, it is advantageous for the other
side to have as large a win-set as possible. This is where public diplomacy comes in.
To bridge the unfortunate divide between international relations research on
conflict resolution and on public diplomacy, analysts should revive Robert Put-
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Figure 1 Influence and diplomacy in two-level games.
Note: Depicts narrative descriptions of two-level games (Putnam 1988: 435–437), public
diplomacy (Nye 2004: 105–108; Snow 2009: 6–8), and reverberation (Putnam 1988: 454–
455).
seek to expand one another’s win-sets. Much ambassadorial activity” involves “seek-
ing to relax domestic constraints that might otherwise prevent the administration
from cooperating with their governments.” Public diplomacy is perfectly suited to
this kind of outreach: engaging and conciliating the foreign public to build a pro-
cooperation coalition expands the adversary’s win-set (Copeland 2009, 163). Not
all public diplomacy efforts necessarily seek reverberation—they might achieve na-
tional goals strictly by working with, within, or against foreign societal actors, rather
than by leveraging those actors’ relations with their own government. Reverbera-
tion, however, is a particularly important subset of public diplomacy, in which a state
uses societal allies abroad to bring their government to the table or to empower that
government to make particular concessions. (Figure 1 depicts the two-level game,
public diplomacy, and reverberation.) Reverberation can also be thought of as the
inverse of Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s (1998, 12–13) boomerang model of
transnational activism. Both models involve coordination between Home Govern-
ment and Target Society (in the terms of Figure 1) to press Target Government for
concessions but with the direction of influence reversed: activists in Target Society
recruit Home Government (via the activists’ connections in Home Society) to put
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Reverberation received scholarly attention in studies of interstate negotiations
shortly after Putnam’s article (Odell 1993; Snyder 1993). The most sustained
analysis of this strategy demonstrates that it was an enduring hallmark of Soviet
prenegotiation behavior on arms control (Griffiths 1989). Importantly for conflict
resolution, reverberation was a critical component of Sadat’s concessions toward
Israel and the successful negotiation of the Camp David accords (Stein 1993) and
was later tantalizingly suggested as a possible source of rivalry termination elsewhere
(Hensel 1999). However, it has largely (and unfortunately) vanished as a research
agenda, even though the international relations discipline would seem well posi-
tioned to revive it. After all, the two-level games concept is now canonical in studies
of trade negotiations (Milner 1997; Silva 2007; Fernández de Castro and Leycegui
2015), and even political realists increasingly take a “neoclassical” approach in-
corporating domestic political pressures and constraints on decisionmakers (Rose
1998; Ripsman et al. 2016).
Reverberation, and two-level games more broadly, involves several dilemmas and
paradoxes—for instance, just as leaders have incentives to expand their opponent’s
win-set by building a pro-cooperation coalition within the opponent’s country, they
also have incentives to reduce their own win-set by undermining pro-cooperation
coalitions at home. This creates potential contradictions in foreign and domestic
policy, and inconsistencies or weak popular support can undermine policy effective-
ness (see Copeland 2009, 167). And international threats to build domestic support,
signal preferences, and reduce one’s win-set invite reciprocity, create dangerous
spirals, and undermine the potential for negotiated compromises (unless such
threats raise the opponent’s relative costs of not negotiating, or induce a third party
to intervene) (Mares 2001). Studies of public diplomacy and conflict resolution
have much to offer one another, by exploring the practice and unintended conse-
quences of reverberation.
The Puzzling Intractability of Argentine-Brazilian Rivalry
Can public diplomacy, through reverberation, help resolve international conflict?
More concretely, among the population of protracted interstate rivalries, where
might outreach to foreign publics succeed? Ideally, a public diplomat would like
a situation of stasis that is open to creativity, where structural factors suggest a
ripe climate but where hostility is not so severe that it calls for excessive heroism.
Least-likely cases include territorial disputes, particularly those over sacred space;
conflicts with recent or severe bloodshed, which lead to hostile identities, trauma,
or narratives of victimhood; and mutual misperceptions (see Leng 2000; Hassner
2009). In such circumstances, unreciprocated cooperation can be politically fatal
(Colaresi 2004) and apologies can lead to blowback at home (Lind 2008). Relatively
nonviolent rivalries, particularly positional strategic rivalries (Colaresi, Rasler, and
Thompson 2007) offer a set of most-likely cases. Regime type and alliance portfolio
also affect the likelihood of cooperation: where a totalitarian North Korea, allied
with China, faces off against a US-allied, democratic South Korea, public diplomacy
faces tall odds. Similar regimes with a shared great power ally, however, offer more
promising terrain for peacebuilding.
The relationship between Argentina and Brazil in 1976–77 met all of these cri-
teria. If public diplomacy can help resolve interstate conflicts, it should have suc-
ceeded there. First, in contrast to neighboring rivalries, like those of Ecuador and
Peru, Bolivia and Chile, or Argentina and Chile, the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry fo-
cused on nonterritorial issues and had not endured a military clash for genera-
tions. In the mid-1970s, the most sensitive dispute involved competing hydroelec-
tric power projects on the Paraná River and its tributaries: Brazil was constructing
a dam with Paraguay on their shared border, which would affect the availability of
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dam along its own border with Paraguay. Although the hydroelectric dispute pro-
vided the main focus for debate and for the negotiations leading to rapprochement
in 1979–80, Argentina and Brazil also competed in several other domains: for US
favor, for regional influence and leadership, for military readiness under what their
armed forces called the “hypothesis of conflict,” and for technological superior-
ity and prestige regarding nuclear energy (Darnton 2014, chapter 3). As a result,
the technical disagreements over turbines, dam heights, and the international le-
gal treatment of waterways took on highly political significance and stood in for
an underlying relationship of strategic rivalry. However, none of these issues was
indivisible or sacred; all were in principle negotiable and amenable to diplomatic
overtures.
Second, the two governments had several common features and interests. Both
Argentina (after the 1976 coup) and Brazil were changing several policies to correct
a pattern of failures, which should have contributed to ripeness for conflict resolu-
tion. The Argentine junta set its central objectives as correcting civilian errors, rang-
ing from economic crisis to political polarization to open insurgency. And in Brazil,
the military regime initiated foreign policy shifts and domestic political “decom-
pression” after the October 1973 oil shock, in recognition of cracks in the so-called
“Brazilian miracle” of authoritarian development. Moreover, the two regimes had
similar ideologies with respect to the Cold War and had a number of subregional
cooperative and communications channels open, from the River Plate Basin diplo-
matic summits after 1968 to the military and intelligence network of Operation
Condor after 1974. Economic downturn, debt, and inflation by the decade’s end
surely contributed to ripeness and rapprochement (Resende-Santos 2002; Oelsner
2005). And costs may have pushed Brazil to change its negotiating stance even be-
fore this, with Brazil’s failure to coerce Argentina and to reward Paraguay suffi-
ciently, such that a unilateral approach bore significant opportunity costs relative to
regional negotiation (Soares de Lima 1986). However, the inability of both parties
to agree to negotiate for nearly a year and a half after the Argentine coup, despite
all of these incentives, needs further explanation.
Finally, public diplomacy was actually attempted, and rivalry was eventually over-
come, making this case particularly important for Latin American diplomatic his-
tory as well as offering a valuable and apparently positive case for theory testing. Res-
olution of the hydroelectric dispute in October 1979 paved the way for decades of
political cooperation, economic integration, and strategic alliance. However, reach-
ing an accord and even getting to the table took years of surprisingly difficult and
protracted diplomatic wrangling. These delays are particularly surprising because
the protagonists were two anti-Communist military regimes with several common
interests, including countering the perceived threat of leftist subversion. Initial Ar-
gentine overtures to Brazil failed, and the road to the 1979 rapprochement featured
intermittent stalemate and backsliding. Argentine Ambassador Oscar Camilión’s
strategy of public diplomacy to outflank the obstructionist bureaucracy and engage
potential supporters of Argentine-Brazilian cooperation unintentionally mobilized
opposition in the foreign ministries of both countries and nearly led to his dis-
missal. If structural factors incentivized cooperation, and if motivated agents tried
to tip the scales further in that direction, why did prenegotiations drag out for over
a year (to say nothing of the two years of negotiations that followed)? Why are some
cooperative gestures self-defeating?
The Perils of Public Diplomacy: Camilión in Brasília
The Argentine junta that took power on March 24, 1976, faced two acute problems
in foreign policy: the hydroelectric conflict with Brazil and a territorial dispute with
Chile. To deal with Brazil, the junta appointed Oscar Camilión (a journalist and
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1960s) as ambassador. In his memoirs, Camilión recalls receiving “quadruple offer,”
since the heads of each military service and the chief of the Higher Joint Staff sep-
arately asked him to take up the post in Brasília; “It was a kind of message” that the
military wanted the hydroelectric dispute resolved, telling him “in the most categor-
ical manner: ‘You will have total freedom of action. You will determine the policy to
follow in Brazil so that Argentina obtains a reasonable solution to the problem of
the rivers’” (2000, 190).5 Camilión sought to “overcome all the anachronistic inher-
itances of the past,” recognizing “no contradiction between the execution and ful-
fillment of the principal national objectives of Brazil and the principal objectives of
Argentina” (2000, 197). Thus, Camilión explained, “my strategy upon taking charge
of the embassy” was to “replant the Argentine-Brazilian relationship in the sense of
the total advantage of an organic friendship between the countries” (2000, 197). In
short, Camilión set out to forge a rapprochement and believed he had the domestic
backing to do so.
However, other accounts suggest that Camilión’s mandate was less ironclad. One
of the few books drawing on interviews with Argentina’s president, General Jorge
Videla, explains that he personally selected key ambassadors, while the Navy com-
mander appointed an admiral, César Guzzetti, as foreign minister (Seoane and
Muleiro 2001, 242). And an account using Brazilian Foreign Minister Azeredo
da Silveira’s oral history and personal archive relates that Camilión’s nomination
involved Videla holding a meeting “unprecedented in the annals of Argentine
diplomacy” with three ex–foreign ministers (notably, not his current foreign min-
ister, Guzzetti) and Camilión May 12, 1976, to work out a road to cooperation
with Brazil, and the Foreign Ministry sent Camilión’s nomination to Brazil’s Min-
istry of Foreign Relations the following day (Spektor 2001, 161). This apparently
established a dual mandate in foreign policy toward Brazil. Camilión politely re-
calls that Guzzetti and his successor (yet another admiral), Oscar Antonio Montes,
“did not create obstacles, but neither were they an engine in favor” of cooperation
(Camilión 2000, 216). However, one review of Silveira’s oral history suggests a lin-
gering suspicion that Camilión “did not have the unrestricted support of Buenos
Aires” (because an ambassador, in Silveira’s own words, “does not have his own
judgment. He follows instructions”) and concludes that the Brazilians essentially
misperceived how much authority Camilión really had (Spektor 2001, 163). A key
problem for Camilión’s initiatives would be not simply building Brazilian support
for rapprochement but securing the unified support of his own government.
Scholars know a good deal about the gap between Argentine and Brazilian posi-
tions circa 1976 and about Camilión’s efforts to bridge this through public diplo-
macy and reverberation. Brazil, and particularly Silveira, maintained that there was
no dispute to resolve (while working to build its hydroelectric dam as a fait accom-
pli) (Moniz Bandeira 2003, 423–24). Brazilian President Geisel related in an oral
history interview that he extensively delegated foreign policy decision-making to
Silveira, who handled relations with Argentina (the hydroelectric dispute takes up
just two of Geisel’s 464 pages of interview transcripts) (D’Araujo and Castro 1997,
346–47, 359; Spektor 2010, 303–4). Silveira’s June 1976 farewell remarks to Camil-
ión’s departing predecessor indicate Brazil’s position: the countries were expanding
their commerce more than ever, so surely the bilateral relationship, already strong,
would only improve (Resenha 1977a, 146). In contrast, Jornal do Brasil reported on
the eve of Camilión’s arrival that he “defends a more direct understanding with the
Brazilian Government,” especially on the hydroelectric issue (July 2, 1976, 2).
Facing a unified Brazilian governmental refusal to negotiate, Camilión spear-
headed an Argentine effort to outflank the Brazilian Foreign Ministry’s obstruction-
ism and boost domestic support in Brazil for cooperation with Argentina—in other
words, to use reverberation to expand Brazil’s win-set (Camilión 2000, 196, 200,
5
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215). This struck Silveira as exceedingly unprofessional, since “in diplomacy it is pre-
cisely that which is not noticed that matters. Effectiveness has to be achieved with-
out the excessive notoriety of the ambassador’s activities” (quoted in Spektor 2001,
163). The contest between Camilión and Silveira became an “intense battle in the
area of communications media,” a “battle for public opinion” that escalated in 1977
and involved Silveira replacing his press advisor in order to match Camilión’s tactics
(Camilión 2000, 198, 203). The replacement advisor, future foreign minister Luiz
Felipe Palmeira Lampreia, recalled that Camilión’s willingness and ability to “work
the Brazilian press” (primarily female reporters, Lampreia observed) was “driving
Silveira crazy” (Lampreia 2010, 79). According to Camilión, the episode “is studied
as a special case study” by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry and has been considered
“the most difficult negotiation that Brazil made in the twentieth century” (2000,
204). Did Camilión’s public diplomacy actually create a constituency for coopera-
tion and expand Brazilian leaders’ win-set and why or why not?
What has not yet been clarified, and what new archival research can demonstrate,
are the differences in position and worldview among Argentine decisionmakers and
what impact these had on the ability of public diplomacy to achieve formal negoti-
ations (i.e., Level I talks, in Putnam’s model). Argentine Foreign Ministry records
from June and July 1976 reveal clearly divergent perspectives between Camilión and
his superiors in Buenos Aires, not only regarding what each hoped to achieve with
Brazil but also what they meant by a global view of the bilateral relationship. For
the Foreign Ministry, the ultimate goal was to achieve particular Argentine interests
on disputed issues; to achieve this, negotiations with Brazil were necessary, and to
maximize negotiating leverage and get Brazil to the table, limited cooperative over-
tures would be tactically useful. Thus, in June, the head of the Argentine Foreign
Ministry’s Latin America Department recommended “reformulating our political
strategy toward the neighboring country, not from a strictly bilateral standpoint,
but from a global perspective, in the belief that everything that is executed from a
universal-regional level will directly influence the Argentine-Brazilian connection”
(AHCA 1976a). Thus, limited outreach to Brazil on less-conflictual issues would be
instrumental: “The creation of a climate of confidence in Argentine-Brazilian rela-
tions or at least, not of generalized controversy, could make itself viable through
joint treatment of issues that do not present greater difficulties, within the com-
plex of matters to negotiate simultaneously and globally” (AHCA 1976a). Camil-
ión’s appointment would help maximize Argentine interests: “The designation of
a new Ambassador in Brasília opens a new negotiating stage,” although it is “nec-
essary that our country first define with clarity its objectives in order to strengthen
its negotiating capacity,” while pursuing “the immediate objective of improving the
current position of weakness . . . in which our country finds itself in relation to
Brazil”; thus, having “[d]iscarded a policy of confrontation, limiting and counter-
productive for our bilateral interests and for our global diplomatic action . . . a new
dialogue” might be useful, “without giving up in the defense of our fundamental
national interests” (AHCA 1976a).
However, Camilión’s first major report from Brasília emphasized friendship, con-
versation, and engagement, rather than negotiation. Camilión noted that the bilat-
eral relationship had tremendous press and that “in practically unanimous form,
the tone of this material has been positive and in many cases, directly friendly.” As
expected, Silveira, when Camilión presented his credentials, was “very cordial in
personal terms but eluded in careful manner any reference either to issues between
Brazil and Argentina or even to bilateral relations” (AHCA 1976b). Camilión pro-
ceeded indirectly, which would characterize his operations for years, asking Silveira
“about some things related to organizational aspects of” the Foreign Ministry, “an
old vocation of the chancellor—and subsequently I shifted the conversation to the
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Camilión’s eagerness for cooperation, and readiness to detect Brazilian reci-
procity, are clear in his discussion of meeting President Geisel. Because Geisel’s
“austere condition . . . is known, as is his scarce propensity to exaggerations,”
“the evident decision to emphasize the ceremony and to give it prestige should
be noted as a political act” (AHCA 1976b). Geisel “was very cordial” and “ex-
pressed in clear form his objective of closer relations with Argentina . . . He
was clear also in the mention of those who work to create obstacles in the bi-
lateral relationship and very direct in the suggestion that he would see it di-
rectly each time that it was needed” (AHCA 1976b). Camilión outlined the “pro-
posals of the Argentine government relative to the relations with Brazil” and
underlined “the great national priority that in these moments the fight against
subversion represents,” to which Geisel “expressed his hope in a swift victory
against terrorism and violence” (AHCA 1976b). The overall “climate of cor-
diality has been promoted, in the first place, by President Geisel himself and
the [Foreign Ministry] has not dissented,” either in person or in the press, al-
though “the basic attitude of the Brazilians is that of expectancy” (emphasis in orig-
inal), due to perceptions that Argentina had not been a valid interlocutor and con-
cerns “that the Argentine government could try to ‘manufacture’ a conflict with
Brazil as a diversion operation, given our internal difficulties” (AHCA 1976b). Thus,
Camilión planned to promote “a positive attitude that will improve the climate,
reestablish confidence, win adepts in the influential social circles, and neutralize the
spokesmen of extreme positions, in particular those who have access to the press”
(AHCA 1976b). He concluded that cooperation required “an objective and frank
appreciation of the global reality of Argentina and Brazil, not always summed up
within the viewpoint of their respective [foreign ministries]” (AHCA 1976b).
Camilión and his superiors began with divergent assumptions, which boded
poorly for effective diplomacy. A global perspective, for the Foreign Ministry, meant
considering several linked issues, including some outside the bilateral relationship,
to address through comprehensive negotiations. For Camilión, a global perspective
meant transcending the foreign ministries, engaging the press and public opinion,
and emphasizing a holistic bilateral relationship rather than a negotiated push for
national advantage. As a result, when Camilión’s public diplomacy offended the
Brazilian government, contributed to mixed messages about Argentine positions,
or simply attracted intense press coverage, he needed to justify his activities—and
his continued employment—to Buenos Aires. Only three days after Camilión’s tri-
umphant July 13 report, he delivered an obsequious and defensive (if not actu-
ally chastened) letter to Foreign Minister Guzzetti, explaining that his press con-
ference “was equivalent to a sort of mortal leap over a narrow net. The meeting
was incisive and full of dangerous questions”; moreover, Camilión says he was of-
ten misquoted (the examples, if accurate, would certainly have upset the Argen-
tine junta), but the press overall acted in “good faith” and as a “positive and con-
structive stimulus . . . on which the first course of our management can in good
measure depend” (AHCA 1976c). Presumably this smoothed things over, since
Camilión kept his job and even sought to expand his public outreach beyond
the capital, informing Brazil’s Foreign Ministry of his “special interest” in officially
visiting Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in August (AHCA 1976d). However, the
diplomatic impasse continued until two-level tensions erupted more forcefully the
following year.
Meanwhile, in late 1976, the primary locus of prenegotiations shifted to the min-
isterial and presidential levels, toward formal Level I channels rather than pub-
lic diplomacy. Videla telegrammed Geisel in August as a goodwill gesture, sur-
prising the Brazilian Foreign Ministry and giving a new impulse to bilateral con-
versations (Memoria 1976, 32; Resenha 1977b, 114). An apparent sign of progress
came in December, with the River Plate Basin countries’ foreign ministers’ meet-
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Memoria 1976, 32). Two major documents from mid-1977 recall this as a high point
of prenegotiations that subsequently collapsed. A memorandum on Brazil policy
by the new head of the Argentine Foreign Ministry’s Latin America Department
briefly noted Camilión’s arrival in Brazil but suggested that the foreign ministries
authored the major diplomatic achievements of 1976; the December meeting in
particular “laid the ‘bases’ to handle the existing problems with a new ‘tone,’ identi-
fying themes of common interest that would universalize the connection and would
avoid the particularized analysis of the pending issues” ((emphasis in original),
AHCA n.d. a). Similarly, Foreign Minister Oscar Montes (who replaced Guzzetti
in May 1977 after the latter was grievously wounded in an assassination attempt
[Camilión 2000, 188]) reported to Videla that at the December meeting, “the bases
of a new understanding between Argentina and Brazil were laid,” and when the
chancellors met “for the first time, the acceptance that problems existed regarding
the exploitation of shared rivers was achieved, and it was agreed that it was necessary
to overcome these through negotiated formulas,” which produced “a new climate
. . . more propitious for the search for a concerted solution” (AHCA 1977a).
Meanwhile, the Carter administration, inaugurated January 1977, unintention-
ally catalyzed Argentine-Brazilian coordination by pressuring both countries over
human rights abuses and nuclear programs; in March, Brazil canceled its mili-
tary accords with the United States, symbolically rupturing a partnership dating
to World War Two (Resenha 1978a, 93, 113; Veja 1977a). Camilión declared Argen-
tine support for Brazil’s nuclear ambitions, exploiting the breach with the United
States to promote Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement; however, he did so without
instructions from Buenos Aires and was nearly fired (Camilión 2000, 202–3). Pres-
idential and ministerial efforts continued: in March 1977, Argentina proposed tri-
lateral negotiations (Brazil did not respond immediately, although Paraguay ap-
proved), and in April Geisel and Videla met separately with Paraguayan dictator
Alfredo Stroessner to discuss hydroelectric issues (Memoria 1977, 40, 42, Jornal do
Brasil, April 12, 1977).
However, these overtures did not resolve the Argentine-Brazilian impasse, and Ar-
gentine decisionmakers grew increasingly frustrated. One Foreign Ministry report
criticized Brazil’s “attitude of systematic intransigence,” by which “the expectations”
built by the December meeting were “gradually defrauded by a series of gestures
or acts seemed intent on bringing the relationship back to levels more negative
even than those reached since 1973”; Brazil apparently employed “a truly dilatory
policy intended to dissemble the real objective: presenting consummated and ir-
reversible deeds” through its dam construction (AHCA n.d. a). Likewise, Foreign
Minister Montes observed that when Camilión sought an answer to the March note
proposing trilateral talks, Silveira “showed himself opposed to trinational negoti-
ations” and suggested only “secret bilateral conversations” but without explaining
what these would entail (AHCA 1977a).
If presidential and ministerial encounters could not deliver negotiations, then
Argentine-Brazilian relations were back to where they had been when Camilión was
appointed a year earlier. Once again, he must have found public diplomacy attrac-
tive (despite setbacks in July 1976 and February 1977), since the Brazilian govern-
ment seemed willing to yield the stage. In May, Geisel echoed Silveira’s traditional
stance that media outreach leads people to “to confuse publicity with negotiations”
(quoted by Spektor 2001, 163). Within the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, the attitude
was that “diplomacy is not made with floodlights” (Lampreia 2010, 81). (For Camil-
ión, of course, floodlights were the key to suasive reverberation and ultimately rap-
prochement.)
Two further press scandals—both involving leaks leading to mutual
recriminations—apparently changed Silveira’s mind. First, Silveira’s infamous
May “secret speech” to Brazil’s Senate Committee on Foreign Relations blamed
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testimony was announced in advance and summarized in detail (and briefly
quoted) in the next day’s papers (Jornal do Brasil, May 17, 1977, 5; May 18, 1977,
3). The speech’s release produced mixed congressional reactions (Resenha 1978b,
93–94) and newspaper editorials critical of Silveira, creating pressures (including
among military leaders) for Geisel to fire him. The Argentine Foreign Ministry
expressed “the displeasure of our government” concerning the speech, both via
Camilión in Brasília and to the Brazilian ambassador in Buenos Aires (AHCA
1977a). Second, in July, leaked Argentine-Brazilian communiqués in a Brazilian
paper caused the Argentine Foreign Ministry to protest, deny responsibility, and
warn that such an “anomalous act . . . should be analyzed with great thoroughness
to avoid situations that lend themselves to any mal-intentioned interpretation . . .
[T]exts of this nature should be published by common accord” (AHCA 1977b).
After this, Brazil’s Foreign Ministry openly entered the lists, counteracting Camil-
ion’s reverberation efforts with its own societal outreach to line up public support
for the Brazilian government’s existing position, essentially minimizing its win-set
to strengthen its negotiating position with Argentina. In July, Silveira switched press
advisors and strategies (Jornal do Brasil, July 12, 1977, 3). The new spokesman, Luiz
Felipe Lampreia, recalls that Silveira gave him “carte-blanche” to emulate and de-
feat Camilión; Lampreia decided that “what was essential . . . was to do what Camil-
ión was doing, that is to say, it was to give information, it was even to expose oneself,
it was to reason with the press, it was to try to capture them, right?” (Lampreia
2010, 79). Thus, two of Silveira’s deputies, future foreign ministers Lampreia and
Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, argue in oral histories that Silveira defeated Camilión by
adopting his tactics (Guerreiro 2010, 259–63; Lampreia 2010, 78–85).
With the press campaigns at an impasse, both governments lurched toward ne-
gotiations. The standoff symbolically peaked with the July 27 publication of Brazil’s
leading newsweekly, Veja—the cover depicted Argentine and Brazilian flags, mov-
ing in opposite directions with giant arrows in the national colors. The headline,
“Argentina-Brazil: The Disagreement” (o desencontro more literally means “the fail-
ure to meet”) led to a cover story, “The Tough Search for Peace,” which con-
cluded a decades-long summary of the bilateral dispute and of contemporary ac-
cusations and frustrations by wryly observing, “At least in relation to one point,
Brazilians and Argentines firmly agree—the necessity of keeping the channels of
understanding open so that the ‘instrumental differences’ . . . are not converted
into an undesirable political confrontation” (Veja 1977b). Silveira announced that
Argentina would respond to a Brazilian note seeking negotiations, although Brazil
maintained several preconditions (Jornal do Brasil, July 28, 1977, 14); the follow-
ing day, Argentina proposed technical conversations on the hydroelectric dams
(Resenha 1978c, 155). Camilión returned from Buenos Aires and, amazingly, of-
fered no comment on the “reinitiation” of dialogue beyond calling it “extremely
constructive” (Jornal do Brasil, August 1, 2). Lampreia announced that after Chan-
cellors Silveira and Montes exchanged notes (through Brazil’s embassy in Ar-
gentina), tripartite talks (including Paraguay) would occur, although the format,
level, and preconditions had not been determined (Jornal do Brasil, August 2, 1977,
4). The Level I diplomatic channels, though frustratingly gradual and technical,
seemed to bear more fruit than the mobilization of societal opinion through public
diplomacy.
The following week involved claims of victory and new risks of defeat. First, both
diplomats managed to declare success and save face. Lampreia confirmed that tri-
partite negotiations were a Brazilian proposal that Argentina had accepted (Jornal
do Brasil, August 3, 1977, 1, 4). However, because Argentina had proposed trilat-
eral talks in May and Brazil rejected them, Camilión declared that Brazil’s decision
to include Paraguay was a “positive attitude” and that Argentina had “always con-
sidered a tripartite reunion valid” (Jornal do Brasil, August 4, 1977, 2). However,
another batch of communiqués between Montes and Silveira appeared in the press,
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1977, 1, 12–13, August 10, 1977, 2; Lampreia 2010, 79). Finally, on August 26, Brazil
formally accepted Argentina’s proposal for technical tripartite conversations to be-
gin in September in Paraguay (Resenha 1987c, 155).
Again, archival records between May and July 1977 suggest ongoing divisions
among Argentine worldviews that complicated policymaking toward Brazil and un-
dermined Camilión’s efforts to build a Brazilian constituency for rapprochement. In
particular, Foreign Minister Montes’ discussion of motivations for Argentina’s out-
reach to Brazil differed markedly from Camilión’s understanding. Where Montes
had seen openness and concessions as tactical, to undermine Brazilian resistance
to negotiations, using cooperative gestures to pave the way for accords conform-
ing to Argentine positions, Camilión believed that Argentina’s goal was coopera-
tion itself—that is, rapprochement. In June, Montes told Videla that Argentina’s
“attitude, inclined toward dialogue and concord, helps place the Brazilian authori-
ties in an uncomfortable situation against their public opinion and other sectors of
power of that country, more favorable to the understanding with Argentina” (AHCA
1977a). Regarding Silveira’s speech, Argentina tried “to facilitate the adjustment of
Brazilian foreign policy, without trying for the possible ‘containment’ of [Silveira]
and his eventual removal, or adopting a policy of hardening that would make the re-
turn to constructive channels difficult” (AHCA 1977a). In contrast, Montes claimed
that Silveira used “intransigent external postures to consolidate his personal situa-
tion,” probably trying to push Argentina to adopt “a hard-line or confrontational
position, which would justify the non-realization of negotiations”; reciprocally, “the
constructive and firm attitude maintained by Argentina . . . weakens the position of
[Silveira] against his public opinion and other sectors of power” (AHCA 1977a).
Camilión, however, still believed public diplomacy and reverberation were essen-
tial to resolving the dispute with Brazil. Since the 1976 coup, Camilión argued to
Montes, “Argentina attempted . . . to replant its relationship with Brazil,” to “giv[e]
those relations a positive character” since “the confrontation with Brazil did not re-
spond to any national interest” and was “sterile” and “based on anachronistic crite-
ria of regional supremacy” (AHCA 1977c). A paramount goal was “gaining allies in
[Brazil] for the cause of an understanding with Argentina”; Camilión claimed that
his “veritable strategy of indirect rapprochement” involved “an intense diplomatic
action to appreciate the value of Argentina . . . and to persuade Brazil—beginning
with groups of decisive influence—of the necessity of establishing a globally positive
connection with our country” (AHCA 1977c). Public diplomacy was useful because
“Usually countries understand one another through their social summits, and they
mistrust one another in their bases. Between Argentines and Brazilians the opposite
more truly occurs,” whereas at the government level Brazil’s Foreign Ministry “(at
least Silveira) does not have interest in a global cooperative action with Argentina”
(AHCA 1977c).
As tensions peaked in July, Camilión’s objectives still varied starkly from those of
the Argentine Foreign Ministry, with the former emphasizing the overall relation-
ship and the latter seeking relative advantage. Camilión reported that the Brazilian
military was uncomfortable with Silveira’s and the Foreign Ministry’s stonewalling
Argentina and that “a high chief who occupies a charge of great weight in the mili-
tary circles expressed to me his serious preoccupation with the state of the bilateral
relationship. He directly put the responsibility on [the Foreign Ministry] for the
state of things . . . Shortly, he added, ‘heads will roll’ . . . there is no-one in the
Armed Forces who wants anything but a good and growing positive relationship
with Argentina” (AHCA 1977d).
In contrast, the head of the Argentine Foreign Ministry’s Brazil Division argued
that a transportation dispute, though minor compared to the hydroelectric issue,
was politically important as an “indicator of the firmness with which the country is
capable of confronting other negotiations—over transcendental issues” (emphasis
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disagreements” among Argentine decisionmakers; Argentina should “offer thus a
united front to the task that, in inverse sense, the Embassies of those countries
develop” (AHCA 1977e). Although the transportation issue hurt Argentine trade
in the short run, “other negotiations . . . over which the image of firmness will
reverberate—jeopardize the national economy (and even sovereignty over its own
resources) with a significance much greater than that” (AHCA 1977e). Conversely,
press attacks on Silveira gave “an advantage in favor of Argentina that it should not
fail to take advantage of,” while any economic risks to Argentina “award an interest-
ing margin of negotiation against the current damages that Brazil suffers” (empha-
sis in original; AHCA 1977e). An internal report after bilateral transportation talks
in August reiterated this perspective, calling the meeting “a lucky trial by fire for
the negotiating capacity of both countries on the important issues”; reaching minor
compromises on technical issues showed “that the will (especially Argentine) was
to demonstrate the possibility of reaching satisfactory accords for both parties” on
more important matters (AHCA n.d. b).
Although Camilión’s efforts contributed to bilateral dialogue toward official ne-
gotiations, this hardly signaled the end of rivalry. Tripartite talks began September
1977 in Paraguay (Resenha 1978d, 135). However, negotiated resolution of the hy-
droelectric dispute, like getting to the table initially, required two tortuous years
of backsliding, accusations of bad faith, and standoffs. The Argentine Foreign Min-
istry’s annual report for 1977 struggled to offer a positive interpretation of the year’s
bilateral events, claiming as accomplishments only “the continuation of dialogue
. . . communication . . . [and] the information necessary to understand better the
technical aspects of the respective projects” (Memoria 1977, 27). The following year’s
summary (Memoria 1978, 23) begins with a terse sentence: “As in 1977.”
Moreover, the contribution of public diplomacy to even this limited shift is dubi-
ous. Camilión’s efforts were undermined by his superiors in Argentina and eventu-
ally put in check by their Brazilian counterparts. Although Camilión recalled that
in 1977 a Brazilian diplomat told him over a game of golf that “You’ve just won
the battle of the press,” this should hardly be taken as definitive (2001, 203). Ironi-
cally, Camilión, who had tried to improve relations rather than drive hard bargains,
nearly fell victim to a goodwill gesture himself: Montes’ successor as Argentine For-
eign Minister in 1978, Carlos Washington Pastor, offered Silveira Camilión’s head
(according to Silveira: Spektor 2010, 247). Both Camilión and Silveira, who entered
their positions intending to resolve the dispute for their own reasons, were unable
to do so (Lampreia 2010).6 The hydroelectric treaty was signed by Silveira’s succes-
sor, Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, and by Washington Pastor, who had largely sidelined
Camilión.
Reverberation Revisited
During his mission in Brazil from 1976 to 1981, Argentine Ambassador Oscar Camil-
ión faced a series of ironic dilemmas. He felt his assignment was to deliver rap-
prochement, but the Argentine Foreign Ministry really wanted only limited cooper-
ation with Brazil in order to gain leverage for competition in other areas. He tried
to resolve disputes with Brazil over hydroelectric power, but the Brazilian Foreign
Ministry refused to admit that there was anything to negotiate (a negotiating tactic
in itself). And given bureaucratic resistance, he chose a public diplomacy strategy,
appealing to the Brazilian public for support for a more cooperative bilateral rela-
tionship, but he nearly lost his job several times over scandals in the press. Camil-
ión sought what Robert Putnam (1988, 455) calls “suasive reverberation,” mobiliz-
ing domestic societal pressure within Brazil to expand Brazil’s win-set for conflict
6
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resolution with his home country of Argentina. However, this reverberation failed
to materialize, and the conflict was later resolved through other channels.
How should researchers assess Camilión’s impact on Brazilian opinion, and on
specific governmental and societal actors?7 Ulimately, Camilión’s goal of bilateral
rapprochement was achieved, and he subsequently served as Argentine foreign min-
ister. However, the Brazilian allies he identified—particularly the armed forces and
the general public—seemed already sympathetic to his cause (and responsive to
evolving domestic and international circumstances), rather than yielding to his per-
suasion. Camilión’s cables were determinedly optimistic, and his diplomatic out-
reach was omnivorous (military and civilian, societal and governmental), but his
strategy and progress reports remained opaque on leveraging specific engagements
for actors’ policy support. Because archival sources and memoirs are purposive doc-
uments (George and Bennett 2005, 101–8) that serve their authors’ interests, fre-
quently claiming personal success and redirecting blame, scholars might expect
public diplomats to take credit swiftly when any channels of influence bear fruit.
Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence (for instance, future work should
examine Brazilian archives), so some caution attends these findings, but Argen-
tine records of Ambassador Camilión’s first eighteen months in Brasília yield sur-
prisingly little process-tracing indication of suasive reverberation. Camilión kept
dialogue alive and deserves remembrance as an ardent promoter of Argentine-
Brazilian rapprochement. However, he encountered great difficulty moving the
levers of public diplomacy.
This case suggests three main findings, and attendant directions for future re-
search, about the conditions under which diplomats can appeal successfully to
foreign publics to build a constituency for peace and cooperation. First, intragov-
ernmental divisions complicate diplomatic signaling and the construction of over-
lapping win-sets essential for international cooperation, even among authoritarian
states. Building on studies of institutional variation within authoritarian regimes
and their resulting conflict behavior (Weeks 2014) scholars might examine how
those features affect bargaining, diplomacy, and peacemaking. Silveira’s secret testi-
mony in May 1977 “affirmed that the greatest difficulty for resolving the impasse on
the Rio Paraná is Argentina deciding definitively what it wants” (Jornal do Brasil, May
18, 1977, 2). This was an old canard, and Camilión and his superiors found it out-
dated and offensive; Montes wrote to Videla that such allegations “create a false and
inconvenient image of duality with respect to [Argentine] position” and “favor the
non-negotiating will of Brazil” (AHCA 1977a). However, Silveira’s accusation had
some truth to it: different Argentine foreign policy actors knew what they wanted
but wanted different things. Power struggles between Argentine military branches
impacted the autonomy and direction of the civilian bureaucracy including the For-
eign Ministry, which the press and foreign governments observed; these conditions
proved perilous for public diplomacy. Brazil accurately recognized these Argentine
schisms; in other Cold War relationships, though, such mixed signals could be mis-
perceived as vacillation, hard bargaining, or irrationality. For instance, US leaders
often saw anything but lockstep compliance by Latin American governments as a
warning sign of communism, whereas greater attention to Latin American intragov-
ernmental divisions and domestic politics could have been mutually beneficial. Re-
latedly, although Latin American leaders were often acutely aware of US domestic
dynamics, Washington may not have appreciated how much its bureaucratic and
executive-legislative divisions broadcast mixed signals across the Americas.
Second, future work on public diplomacy should analyze not only facilitat-
ing conditions but also active countermeasures. Brazil’s Foreign Ministry was ini-
tially reluctant to enter a public relations competition that Camilión initiated but
subsequently handled such efforts with aplomb. This suggests that the power to
7
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minimize one’s own win-set may be greater than the power of one’s interlocutor to
expand it. (In fact, Thomas Schelling’s discussion (1960, 28) of leaders engaging
publics emphasized the constriction rather than expansion of win-sets.) This might
comfort leaders, who are better positioned than their rivals to persuade their own
constituents. Relatedly, studies of US public diplomacy and anti-Americanism may
be undercounting public diplomacy’s success rate and potential, if the seeds of out-
reach are uprooted by alarmed target governments rather than simply failing to take
root in society. More broadly, international relations arguments about the power of
domestic lobbying groups or public opinion over foreign policy (Reiter and Stam
2002; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007) should investigate governments’ ability to cre-
ate offsetting pressure groups, either at home or abroad, and leaders’ capacity to
reshape or escape from public opinion (Schuessler 2015).
Third, studies of public diplomacy and two-level games could specify how
principal-agent dynamics complicate diplomatic overtures (see Hutchings and Suri
2015, 15–16; Putnam 1988, 456). (In figure 1, this would disaggregate Home Gov-
ernment to look at intrastate bargaining.) Putnam (1988, 431–36) carefully ad-
dressed complexity in negotiation, discussing envoys rather than presidents as
diplomatic actors, mentioning bureaucratic politics and conflicting preferences
within central governments, and noting that negotiators face multiple constituen-
cies rather than a single Level II game; however, his “stylized” treatment of Level
II as “ratification” (435), exemplified by legislative approval of treaties, could mis-
leadingly imply that ambassadors are the extension of unified executive leadership
rather than agents in their own right. As the case of Oscar Camilión suggests, this
simplifying assumption is problematic. Argentine archival documents indicate not
only that Camilión was more committed to rapprochement with Brazil than his su-
periors were but also that public diplomacy reflected his initiative rather than his
instructions. To what extent were senior Argentine decision makers aware of, and
intentionally wielding, the different perspective of their ambassador in Brazil? In
the complex world of principal-agent relations, an ambassador might be most use-
ful when given instructions that he is not meant to fulfill or leeway to experiment in
ways that could later be disavowed. In Camilión’s case, it is difficult to say whether
the difference of views between embassy and ministry was intentional (which might
explain why Camilión kept his job and subsequently became foreign minister) or
incidental (which might explain the close scrutiny and feedback on Argentine po-
sitions).
All of this supports recent studies on the importance of governmental credibil-
ity, consistency, and coordination (as well as the dangers of hypocrisy) in public
diplomacy (see Cull 2012, 180–92; Seib 2009, 240–41). However, it presents a more
dispiriting conclusion for conflict resolution, suggesting that scholars now need to
analyze what many diplomats already confront (very much at their own risk): a heav-
ily circumscribed set of scope conditions for successful engagement with foreign
public opinion. The beauty of reverberation, as a metaphor, is twofold: it attests to
the diplomatic art of indirection rather than frontal engagement, but it also sug-
gests that policy initiatives reflect in complex and unintended ways off of political
actors and their environment. Reverberation matters, but it is difficult to control
and harder still to wield in the service of international peace.
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